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Corporate governance law addresses the misaligned incentives 
between officers and directors of publicly-owned companies and their 
shareholders, and how this can lead to the destruction of shareholder 
value.  Antitrust law governs the interaction between corporations and 
other economic actors in the marketplace and prohibits and penalizes 
anticompetitive agreements, unilateral conduct which unreasonably 
injures competition, and mergers and acquisitions which may 
substantially lessen competition.   
This article explores the puzzling lack of meaningful 
interaction between these two fields of law which govern the internal 
and external operations of key economic players in our economy.  
While a handful of commentators have lamented the lack of a closer 
organic connection between these two bodies of law, most do not even 
notice.  This article goes beyond the conventional disconnect and 
discusses how to create a more unified approach to two key area of 
business law in order to promote the interests of both shareholders and 
consumers in a more systematic and meaningful way.  
In order to better draw the links between the two fields and 
create an ongoing conversation between different fields, different 
working professionals, different types of expertise, and even different 
languages, I proceed as follows.  In Parts I and II, I briefly describe the 
traditional view of both the scope and content of corporate governance 
and antitrust law.  In Part III, I then offer an overview of why there has 
been little overlap or interaction between these critically important 
bodies of business law.  Part IV shows why and how we can do better.  
I examine five areas of antitrust law where a greater knowledge of, 
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and appreciation for, the modern learning in corporate governance law 
would provide for both better competition and corporate governance 
law and policy.   
I begin Part IV with an overview of corporate compliance and 
the unfortunately limited role that corporate governance law plays in 
ensuring lawful behavior.  I then look at interlocking directorates, the 
one provision of the Clayton Act that directly addresses corporate 
governance concerns.  Second, I analyze the critical issue of corporate 
compliance and cartel behavior.  Third, I discuss the more nuanced 
interaction between antitrust enforcement and corporate governance 
for other types of agreements between competitors which may 
sometimes, but not always, violate antitrust law’s rule of reason.  
Fourth, I focus on merger policy where a better understanding of 
corporate governance and corporate finance literature would provide a 
roadmap for identifying certain categories of transactions which 
neither promote shareholder interests nor efficient market competition.  
Finally, I examine the broader question where corporate governance 
principles will, of necessity, continue play its currently limited role in 
ensuring lawful unilateral company behavior. 
My conclusions begin the process of how to do better.  Certain 
of the changes fall on the corporate governance side including greater 
duties and liabilities for officers and directors to prevent harmful and 
illegal conduct that injures shareholders.  Other changes fall on the 
antitrust side of the fence including a greater skepticism for claims of 
synergies and efficiencies in certain categories of mergers that have 
proven time and time again to do nothing to enhance shareholder value 
except when competition is harmed.  But the most important change 
will be a greater willingness for practitioners and policymakers to 
more directly communicate and coordinate so corporate actors can 
pursue legitimate strategies to build value for shareholders and prevent 
unlawful anticompetitive behavior and, at the same time, not pursue 
more dubious strategies that currently fall between the cracks of both 
bodies of law. 
 
I. The Birth of Corporate Governance 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property is the most 
influential book in the field of corporate governance.1  It analyzes how 
managers and directors of large corporations often act in their own 
                                                          
1 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
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best interests rather than the best interests of the shareholders who are 
the real owners of the company.  This important book was written in 
1933 by Adolph Berle, a professor of corporate law at Columbia 
University, who also worked for President Roosevelt and the New 
Deal in numerous capacities.2  His co-author was Gardiner Means, an 
economist at Harvard University who did much of the empirical work 
for the project.3 
The book analyzed how corporations had evolved from the 19th 
century where they were primarily small operations owned and 
operated by an identifiable number of individuals, often family 
members.4  By the early 1930s, corporations were vastly larger and 
more powerful enterprises with an enormous number of shareholders 
who bought and sold their shares on stock exchanges.5  Typically no 
one shareholder owned more than a tiny fraction of the shares of the 
company.6 
Berle and Means introduced the concept of the separation of 
ownership and management to describe the modern corporation where 
the real power lay in the hands of managers and boards of directors 
who typically owned only small amounts of stock in the company.7 
This change meant that ownership changed from active to passive.8  
But it also meant that the form of the wealth that ownership conferred 
was more liquid.9 
The small number of insiders (managers and directors) had 
greater knowledge and different incentives than the large number of 
outsiders (the shareholders) and could operate the company for their 
own benefit, potentially harming the shareholders and the corporation 
itself.  The actual power within the corporation lay with those who 
appointed the directors, typically senior management themselves.10 
                                                          
2 For a succinct biography of his public service see 
http://www.bookrags.com/biography/adolf-augustus-berle-jr/.  
3 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at preface. 
4 Id. at 66. 
5 Id. at 67. 
6 Id. at 68.  This is true in most countries, but most prevalent in the United 
States.  JONATHAN A. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2010). 
7 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 68.  A number of these themes had been 
previously introduced by Berle in an earlier article.  A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). 
8 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 66. 
9 Id. at 67. 
10 Other aspects of the separation of ownership and control came through legal 
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The effective result was a self-perpetuating management which 
often pursued its own interests rather than those of the true owners of 
the corporation.11   Although Berle and Means did not use this term, 
later writers referred to this as the agency cost problem.12  Thus, the 
field of corporate governance was born to consider appropriate ways 
to cure or limit the agency cost problem in the modern public 
corporation. 
Berle and Means termed this a problem of “economic 
governance.’13  The book argued for more voting rights for 
shareholders, more disclosures by management, and other controls for 
the benefit of the shareholders.14  The authors also proposed a broader 
social role for the corporation as a key institution in the modern 
economy and society.15 
 The influence of Berle and Means cannot be understated.  It is 
probably the most cited treatise in corporate law.  It has been cited 
thousands of times in the academic literature and has been credited as 
the inspiration of much of modern corporate law, securities regulation, 
the shareholder democracy movement, the market for corporate 
control, incentive based pay schemes for executives, and most other 
legal proposals to address the conflicting incentives between corporate 
insiders and shareholders. 
For example, there is a direct relationship between the 
concerns of Berle and Means and the two long standing duties 
fiduciary duties imposed on corporate directors; the duty of care and 
                                                                                                                                         
voting shares, and voting trusts and more real world concerns where even a minority 
interest in a large corporation could yield effective control.  Id. at 70. 
11 Id. at 87, 122. 
12 Murray Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen, Introduction to the Transaction 
Edition, in ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY  ix (10th printing 2009); MACEY, supra note 6, at 2; Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
13 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 125. 
14 Id. at 248. 
15 Id. at 309-13.  See also ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 120 
(1959); ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 104-05 
(1954)(each continuing theme of societal accountability of public corporations).  See 
generally William M. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: 
The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE L. REV. 849 
(2010); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s 
Corporatist Origins: Adolph Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 
(2008)(emphasizing Berle’s evolving goals within The Modern Corporation and 





 Corporate Governance and Competition Policy 5 
the duty of loyalty.16 “Good faith” is a subset of both duties, as all 
directors must act in good faith in performing their duties.17 
The duty of loyalty requires that directors consider the interest 
of the corporation over any personal interests so that they do not profit 
improperly at the corporation's expense and avoid self-dealing.18  This 
duty essentially aims to prevent conflicts of interest, self-dealing 
between directors and the corporation which injure shareholders, and 
other conduct which exacerbates agency costs. 
The duty of care generally requires that directors act in good 
faith and with the degree of diligence, care, and skill that an ordinarily 
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.19  In 
Delaware, and many other states, directors are presumed to have made 
informed, rational decisions in an honest and well-meaning way to 
further their business.20  This insulates directors from judicial review 
of their decisions and shields them from personal liability.  This 
presumption rests on the understanding that directors act on a 
disinterested, informed, and good faith basis.   
Critical to understanding these duties is the business judgment 
rule.  The business judgment rule is a “presumption that the Board 
acted independently, with due care, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that its actions were in the stockholders’ best interests.”21  Under 
the business judgment rule, courts will not second guess a board 
decision or substitute its own views if the decision of the board can be 
attributed to “any rational business purpose.”22  The presumption is 
                                                          
16 In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. 1996).  See 
generally, JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY (2d ed. 2007).  
There remains a dispute in the literature whether the duty of good faith is a subset of 
loyalty rather than care or whether it is an overarching duty covering both concepts.  
The literature on both sides is vast and it is beyond the scope of this article to resolve 
this conceptual conundrum. 
17 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968. 
18 McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001). 
19 Smith v. Van Gorkham, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
20 Aronson v. Lewis, 475 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
21 Williams v. Geier, 671 A. 2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996).  See generally DENNIS 
J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
(5th ed. 1998); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
§ 401 (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].  Even this is a default rule.  In 
Delaware and certain other jurisdictions, corporations may adopt charter provisions 
and by-laws absolving directors of breaches of their duty of care, but may not protect 
intentional or criminal conduct.  Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(B)(7) (2010).   See 
generally, MACEY, supra note 6, at 20. 
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strongest when the decision of the board was approved by a majority 
of independent, disinterested directors.23  Thus, plaintiffs have a heavy 
burden to both plead and prove that the board has breached its 
fiduciary duties of good faith, or due care.24  Only then, will the court 
review the merits of the plaintiff’s allegation to determine whether the 
conduct in question was fair to the corporation and its shareholders.25  
Even then, in the absence of faulty process, uninformed decision 
making, or a conflict of interest, the courts have been extremely 
reluctant to impose liability on corporations or its directors, no matter 
how disastrous the consequences of the board’s decision turned out to 
be.26 
                                                          
23 Grabow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988). 
24 The application of the business judgment rule by courts is further complicated 
by the procedural rules which apply to shareholder derivative suits.  A derivative 
lawsuit is a claim brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation to redress 
harm done by the publicly traded company, its officers, or directors.  Because such 
causes of action are deemed to belong to the corporation, the plaintiff normally must 
make a demand on the corporation (and its board of directors) for permission to sue 
on behalf of the corporation.  The board of directors may accept or reject such 
demands and the recommendation of the board will be judged under the business 
judgment rule.  Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981).  Not 
surprisingly most boards reject demand to initiate derivative actions.   
However, demand may be excused when it is futile.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984).  This can include situations where the director’s duty of 
loyalty is subject to challenge or where the board has acted outside the confines of 
the business judgment rule.  Even in this situation, the board of directors can 
convene a special litigation committee to investigate the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim, report to the board, and recommend whether the case should be dismissed or 
continued.  Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89.  Most special litigation committees 
recommend the dismissal of the lawsuit they have investigated.  The special 
litigation committee’s recommendations are tested by the court first to determine 
whether the special litigation committee utilized a fair process in its determination.   
Only then would the court proceed to the “merits” of the case challenging the alleged 
violation of the board’s duties and the harm to shareholders.  See generally, FANTO, 
DIRECTORS & OFFICERS, supra note 16 at § 5.7; MACEY, supra note 6 at 130-40; 
BLOCK, supra note 21, at 1379-1808.  For a more positive view of special litigation 
committees see Minor Meyers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation 
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L. REV. 1309 (2009). 
25 See e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del 2006); Cf., 
Jennifer Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 
51 WILL. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) (study of federal court shareholder 
derivative actions showing few damage awards, but frequent changes in governance 
practices).   
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The business judgment rule applies to allegedly poor action, 
rather than inaction, or an outright failure in board oversight.  The 
board will be legally responsible for its failure to act when it has failed 
to consider a particular decision or exercise its judgment at all.27  
Taken as a whole, the board of directors (and particularly the outside 
directors) act as agents for the shareholders, but enjoy substantial 
protection from legal liability for their decisions (or lack thereof) when 
their actions (or inactions) were the result of a proper process, good 
faith, informed decision making, and without an outright conflict of 
interest.28  This modern template has arisen out of the concerns first 
raised by Berle and Means, even if the modern expression of these 
concerns is different from what the founders of corporate governance 
themselves advocated for the modern corporation. 
 
II. Antitrust and the Market 
 
 In contrast to corporate governance law which concerns itself 
with the internal organization of the public corporation, antitrust law is 
the law of competition between firms in the marketplace (no matter 
what the internal structure).  The federal Sherman Act and later 
statutes prohibit three main forms of anticompetitive behavior without 
regard to whether the market actors are publicly traded corporations, 
privately owned corporations, partnerships and related entities, sole 
proprietorships, or actual individuals.   
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “contracts, 
combinations and conspiracy” in “restraint of trade.”29  As early as 
1911, the Supreme Court held that only those agreements which 
“unreasonably” restrict competition are unlawful under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.30  However, certain agreements are so inevitably 
destructive of competition that they are per se unreasonable, and hence 
                                                          
27 In addition to the balance of fiduciary duties and the protections of the 
business judgment rule imposed by Delaware and other states corporate law, 
Congress has entered the picture in recent years with the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) and the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, which require 
heightened pleadings standards for securities fraud allegation, automatic removal to 
federal court, and preemption of more generous state court rules. 
28 FANTO, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, supra note 16, at § 2.2.3(A)(3)(c). 
29 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2010). 
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unlawful.31  Examples of such per se unreasonable agreements 
between competitors include price fixing, market division, and output 
restrictions which are normally prosecuted as criminal offenses by the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.32  All other agreements 
require more detailed and complete examination under a full rule of 
reason analysis to determine whether on balance they unreasonably 
restrict competition.33  In this analysis, only the net effect on 
competition is legally relevant and not whether the agreement injures 
competition, but promotes some other socially useful value.34   
 Anticompetitive behavior by single firms is covered by Section 
2 of the Sherman Act which prohibits “monopolization” and “attempts 
to monopolize.”35  In order to unlawfully monopolize, a firm must 
have monopoly power and engage in unlawful or exclusionary conduct 
to either acquire or maintain that monopoly.36  In order to unlawfully 
attempt to monopolize, a firm must 1) have specific intent; 2) engage 
in unlawful or exclusionary conduct; and 3) and have at least a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.37   
The difficult issue for Section 2 analysis is identifying the 
difference between unlawful and exclusionary conduct on the one 
hand and hard competition or competition on the merits on the other 
hand.  While the courts have struggled with this issue, there appears to 
be an evolving consensus that the proper approach is something akin 
to the rule of reason used in Section 1 analysis.   In a number of recent 
Section 2 cases, the courts have sought to determine whether there is a 
significant adverse effect on competition and whether that effect is 
                                                          
31 United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 229 n.59 (1940). 
32 See e.g., Socony Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 150; Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Ass’t 
U.S. Att’y. Gen., Antitrust Div., The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement 
Over the Last Two Decades, Address before the National Institute on White Collar 
Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.htm. 
33 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); NCAA 
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 
1 (2006). 
34 Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); F.T.C. v. 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); see generally, Spencer Weber Waller, 
Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62 S.M.U. L. Rev. 693 (2009). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 2.  In addition Section 2 also prevents conspiracies to 
monopolize, a little used provision which is applied in a manner very similar to 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
36 United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
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outweighed by efficiency considerations, business justifications, or 
other pro-competitive justifications for the conduct at issue.38 
 Finally, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and 
acquisitions of all types if they tend to significantly lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly.39  Here, the focus is on prediction and 
incipiency and blocking acquisitions, regardless of form, if they would 
create a significant risk of harm to competition in the future.  
Government guidelines focus on the risks that the transactions will 
facilitate either outright collusion among the remaining players in the 
markets or anticompetitive oligopolistic (but nominally independent) 
price coordination.40  In addition, the guidelines are equally concerned 
if a transaction would allow the merged entity to unilaterally raise 
price or restrict output.41  Most significant acquisitions are notified to 
the federal antitrust agencies in advance, although the transactions can 
also be challenged after closing.42  Joint ventures, strategic alliances, 
and other types of partial mergers can be analyzed under Section 7, 
although they may also be reviewed under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.43 
  The antitrust laws only rarely are concerned with the internal 
structure of the firms whose conduct is under review.  For example, 
the form of a merger and acquisition is only relevant to the extent that 
it provides evidence of the likely competitive effect of the transaction.  
However, a handful of situations exist where the form or structure of a 
corporate actor is necessary for antitrust purposes.  As discussed 
below in part IV-A, Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits interlocking 
directorates under certain circumstances where it is necessary to 
understand both the competitive relationship of the firms in questions 
and the structure of their board of directors to determine whether this 
provision has been violated.44 
                                                          
38 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
40 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines § 7 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.  [hereinafter 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. 
41 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 40, at § 6. 
42 15 U.S.C. § 18a. 
43 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. 
Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). 
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 In addition, sometimes corporate structure and organization is 
relevant to understanding whether the antitrust laws even apply.  For 
example, Section 1 of Sherman Act requires the presence of a 
“contract, combination or conspiracy” before competitive effects come 
into question.45  This requires some sort of an agreement for Section 1 
to come into play, with Section 2 of the Sherman Act being the only 
antitrust provisions applying to truly unilateral conduct.  The Supreme 
Court has determined that an agreement for Section 1 purposes means 
an agreement between two or more economically independent actors.46  
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that a corporation cannot conspire 
with its own employees, directors, officers, unincorporated divisions, 
and wholly owned subsidiaries.47  The lower courts have extended this 
analysis and held in most circumstances that a corporation also cannot 
conspire with majority owned subsidiaries, or between sister 
subsidiaries owned by the same parent, where there is effective 
working control by the parent corporation.48   
 
III. Ships Passing in the Night 
 
 At the broadest level, corporate governance historically has 
focused on behavior and structure within the firm and antitrust has 
focused on behavior and structure between firms in the market.   One 
is almost sub-atomic in nature and the other focusing on the 
interaction between business atoms and molecules.  Unlike scientific 
inquiry however, the two fields have proceeded without any deep 
interaction and with little attempt to even understand each other’s 
domain.49 
 There are both historical and professional reasons for these 
separate spheres of expertise and legal practice.  Corporate law was 
                                                          
45 15 U.S.C. § 1; see generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF 
CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (2010). 
46 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
47 Id. at 777. 
48 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 27-
34 (6th ed. 2007)(collecting cases); but see Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football 
League, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 2201, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-661.pdf (May 24, 2010)(rejecting 
claim that NFL should be treated as single economic entity in antitrust suit 
challenging exclusive licensing of team merchandise). 
49 One of the few scholarly pieces to connect the two fields focused on the 
boundaries between firms and markets as the key to its analysis.  Edward B. Rock, 
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created first and until the Great Depression was almost entirely a 
creature of state law.50  In contrast, antitrust began at the state level, 
but rapidly became almost exclusively national as state antitrust law 
was proven ineffective in controlling national corporations.51  There 
was a partial early convergence as strict anti-cartel rules, but loose 
merger rules, in the late nineteenth century were partially responsible 
for the initial wave of mergers that created and strengthened the large 
national corporations of the gilded age.52  But then paths diverged. 
When the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, there was no 
specialized antitrust discipline or a specialized antitrust branch of the 
practicing bar or legal academy.53  Antitrust law as a discipline did not 
appear until the 1920s and early 1930s.54  By then, the Sherman Act 
had been supplemented by additional antitrust statutes and the courts 
had decided dozens of antitrust cases. The Federal Trade Commission 
("FTC") had been created in 191455 and the Antitrust Division of the 
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") in 1933.56  Until the 
1920s, antitrust was not even taught as a separate subject in American 
law schools. To the extent it was taught at all, it represented a small 
piece of such courses as Contracts, Corporations, or Business 
Planning.57 
 Law firms were similarly slow in recognizing antitrust as a 
separate discipline. Few, if any, major law firms had separate antitrust 
departments until the early 1950s. The American Bar Association 
                                                          
50 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 at 11-64 
(1991). 
51 James May, The Role of The States in the First Century of Sherman Act and 
the Larger Picture of Antitrust History, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93 (1990); James May, 
Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and 
Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989); James May, Antitrust 
Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual 
Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1981, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495 (1987). 
52
 TONY FREYER,  REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN 
AND AMERICA, 1880-1990 AT 5-7, 15-16 (2008);  BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, MERGERS AND 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY AT THE TURN 
OF THE 20TH CENTURY, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 473 (2003). 
53 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the 
Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283 (2001). 
54 Id. at 285. 
55 Id. at 286. 
56 Id. at 286. 
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("ABA") did not even have a separate Antitrust Section until 1952.58  
In contrast, corporate law was a well established specialty within the 
bar more than a half century earlier.59  While corporate governance 
law was more of a creature of the 1930s it was quickly absorbed into 
this existing professional structure of the corporate bar and remained 
separate from the professional structure and discourse of antitrust. 
  As a result of the impact of the Berle and Means treatise and 
other developments in the wake of the stock market crash and the great 
depression, corporate governance law became part of the New Deal 
agenda and began to make its way into the legal structure of both state 
and federal law in the 1930s and beyond.  At the federal level, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission was created to regulate the 
offerings of securities to the public and then later the operation of 
securities brokers and dealers.60  However, the majority of corporate 
governance law was the province of state law, and Delaware in 
particular, and consisted of more explicit duties of loyalty and care to 
better align the interests of board members, corporate officers, and 
shareholders.61 
 Antitrust was not a significant part of either the analysis nor 
prescription in Berle and Means or the resulting corporate governance 
legal regime.  This is not particularly surprising. Although Berle was 
knowledgeable and interested in antitrust issues,62 antitrust was at its 
absolute nadir at the time he was writing his masterpiece on corporate 
governance.  When The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
                                                          
58 Waller, Language, supra note 53, at 286. 
59 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA 23 (1977); William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron 
Identity Crisis of the Business Lawyer, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 947, 950 (2005-2006); 
Jess M. Krannic, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed 
Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 72 (2005); S. 
Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporate Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1976). 
60 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 1 (2d ed. 2003). 
61 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984); see generally MACEY, supra note 6, at 131.  
See e.g. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating SEC 
rule relating to voting rights by class of securities as beyond powers conferred by 
federal law). 
62 See e.g., ADOLPH A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 43-
51 (1954)(drawing links between antitrust and securities policies which promoted 
rise of institutional investor); NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918-1971: FROM THE 
PAPERS OF ADOLPH A. BERLE 100-01, 158 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal 
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was published in 1933 during the depths of the Great Depression, the 
New Deal was following a collectivist path and antitrust had been 
almost entirely preempted or actually co-opted in the service of the de 
facto cartelization of the US economy under the National Recovery 
Act (NRA).63  What little antitrust enforcement that existed was 
undercut by lax Supreme Court interpretation of the core anti-cartel 
provisions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also seemingly in 
deference to the special needs and circumstances of the Great 
Depression.64  Antitrust law thus was effectively moribund until the 
NRA was held unconstitutional in 1935.65 
 It was only then that President Roosevelt, out of principle, 
pragmatism, or perhaps desperation, chose to revive antitrust law and 
free market competition as a tool to solve the lingering depression.  
Robert Jackson, as head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice 
Department, began the cautious revival of antitrust enforcement.66  
This revival then kicked into high gear during the five year tenure of 
Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division from 1938-43.67 
 Under Jackson, Arnold, and beyond, the Justice Department 
brought hundreds of criminal and civil cases in cartel and 
monopolization cases.  This activism expanded into the merger area as 
well once Congress strengthened Section 7 of the Clayton Act into its 
modern form in 1950.68  As a result of these government cases and 
numerous additional private cases, antitrust law shifted toward more 
and more per se rules,69 presumptions against monopolization,70 and 
                                                          
63 ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A 
STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966); ALLEN BRINKLEY, THE END OF 
REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1996). 
64 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
65 ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
66 ROBERT H. JACKSON, JOHN Q. BARRETT, & WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (2004). 
67 See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 
(2005). 
68 Pub L. No. 96-899, 64 Stat. 1225 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §  18). 
69 United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 1 
(1958); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).  
70 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Al. Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see generally, Spencer Weber Waller, The Story 
of Alcoa: The Enduring Questions of Market Power, Conduct, and Remedy in 
Monopolization Cases, in ANTITRUST STORIES 121 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. 
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nearly absolute prohibition of significant mergers of any kind.71  Such 
limitations proved far more significant than the more modest corporate 
governance constraints of that era. 
 One snapshot of this era can be found in The Corporation and 
Modern Society, a collection of essays edited by the economist 
Edward Mason in 1960 written by prominent legal and economic 
scholars.72  This collection reflects its times where antitrust rules were 
strong and corporate governance constraints weak.73  The primary 
concerns expressed are the oligopoly status of key U.S. corporations 
and the economic, political, and social power of corporations more 
generally.74  Pure corporate governance concerns or agency costs were 
at most a secondary theme of the book and a direct concern of perhaps 
two of the chapters in the volume.75 
 Enter the market for corporate control.  Henry Manne argued 
in his seminal article in 1965 that overly stringent antitrust rules 
against mergers did little to protect competition and primarily served 
to entrench inefficient management to the detriment of shareholders, 
consumers, and competition more generally.76 Manne directly cited 
Berle and Means and their concern for the detrimental effects of the 
separation of ownership and management as one of the key bases for 
his proposals and stated:” [t]he market for corporate control gives to 
these shareholders both power and protection commensurate with their 
interests in corporate affairs.”77  Later influential writings by Frank 
Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, and others echoed these themes and 
                                                          
71 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Phila. 
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Alcoa, 377 U.S. at 271; United States v. Von’s 
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. E. I. duPont, 353 U.S. 586 
(1986); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
72 THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (Edward Mason ed. 1960). 
73 See Mark J. Roe, From Antitrust to Corporation Governance? The 
Corporation and the Law: 1959-1994, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY at 
102 (Carl Kaysen ed. 1996). 
74 Carl Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in MASON, 
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 72, at 85, 89-90. 
75 See Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in MASON, 
supra note 72, at 25; Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate 
Management Responsible?, in MASON, supra note 72, at 46. 
76 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965). 
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advocated a robust takeover market as a way to constrain managerial 
inefficiency, prevent rent seeking, and increase shareholder value.78 
 The calling for a well developed market for corporate control 
required important changes in both antitrust and corporate governance.  
At the time of Henry Manne’s original article, there were strong 
presumptions that any merger that increased market concentration to 
any appreciable degree was unlawful.79  It got to the point where 
Justice Potter Stewart noted in frustration that the only apparent 
consistency in antitrust challenges to mergers was that “the 
government always wins.”80 
 This rapidly changed for antitrust in general and mergers in 
particular.  Most per se rules outside of the cartel area were abandoned 
in favor of a broader more economically intensive inquiry under the 
rule of reason.81  The plaintiff, rather than the defendant had the 
burden of proof that a defendant had meaningful monopoly power (or 
nearly so) and that it had acted to harm competition without an 
offsetting business justification.82 
 In the merger area, the change was even more dramatic.  The 
presumption of illegality where industry concentration increased was 
weakened.83  Government guidelines laid out a much higher degree of 
market concentration and a more rigorous analytical framework before 
the government would seek to challenge most mergers.84  The courts, 
in turn, began to hold the government to these higher burdens of proof, 
although the guidelines on their face only spoke to questions of 
                                                          
78 MACEY, supra note 6, at 118-26; Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, 
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982). 
79 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
80 United States v. Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966)(Stewart, J. 
dissenting). 
81 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U. S. 320 (1961); Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 
U.S. 36 (1977); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 
472 U.S. 284 (1985);  Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3 (1997); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877 (2007). 
82 United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
83 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
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prosecutorial discretion and not directly to case law and litigation.85  
The rise of the market for corporate control thus coincided with a 
weakening of merger control and even calls within the Reagan 
Administration in the 1980s to abolish Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
entirely.86 
 On the corporate governance side, important changes were 
happening as well.  Increased duties to maximize the value of the 
corporation emerged once a meaningful bidding process has begun.87  
On the other hand, the courts were much less willing to limit 
corporations from enacting poison pills and similar anti-takeover 
devices which protected management.88  Finally, a number of states 
enacted anti-takeover statutes which generally survived court 
challenge.89  
 In more recent times, the corporate scandals of the late 1990s, 
the new millennium, and the ongoing financial crisis have led to other 
important changes in corporate governance, often reactive to the crisis 
or scandal of the moment.  The accounting and fraud scandals of the 
Enron era led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and greater duties of CEOs 
and CFOs in connection with the preparation and certification of 
financial statements.90  The 2008 financial crisis that began with the 
melt-down of the US sub-prime mortgage market and then spread 
throughout the US and global economy led to a series of financial 
reform measures enacted in the summer of 2010 all of which contain 
regulatory, disclosure, and corporate governance proposals of different 
natures.91  Thus, in some areas of corporate governance the federal 
                                                          
85 United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990); FTC v. Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 
2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004); FTC v. Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. D.C. 2004). 
86 See ABA Antitrust Section Examines Deregulation, Enforcement Shifts, 49 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 156 (1985); Monopolies Subcommittee 
Receives Views on Division’s Enforcement Record, 48 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 
REP. (BNA) 455 (1985). 
87 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Revlon v. 
MacAndrews, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
88 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del.1989); 
Moran v. Household, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)(no violation of fiduciary duties in 
maintaining or approving poison pill). 
89 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
90 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (enacted July 30 
2002). 
91 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 
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securities and regulatory provisions may have far greater impact on 
corporate boards and committees than the more forgiving Delaware 
corporate law.92 
 At the same time, antitrust law and enforcement appear to be 
on a mild resurgence.  Most commentators consider the Bush era 
Antitrust Division to be relatively inactive on antitrust enforcement, on 
any issue other than criminal cartel enforcement, and also typically 
hostile to private antitrust suits.93  In contrast, the Obama 
administration almost immediately announced plans for more 
aggressive enforcement of the antitrust laws beyond the cartel area,94 
and has pursued a modestly expanded array of investigations, cases, 
settlements, and amicus briefs in its first and a half year in office. 
 What emerges is a pattern of oscillation.  At most times over 
the past 120 years, the relative strength of antitrust and corporate law 
has been like two sine waves which only occasionally intersected as 
one field was on the rise and the other was been on the decline.  We 
are at a rare historical intersection point where both fields are in 
positions of relative strength and only time will tell if that is a stable 
trend or merely another brief intersection as one field is strengthened 
through legislation and court interpretation and the other weakened by 
                                                          
92 FANTO, supra note 16, at § 3.32. 
93 There is a more complex picture at the FTC during this period which 
continued to bring a number of high profile civil non-merger cases.  See William E. 
Kovacic, Burnell Lecture on U.S. Federal Trade Commission, The Future of U.S. 
Competition Policy at Home and Abroad (23 Mar., 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/090323burrelllecture.pdf.  One example of the 
difference in enforcement philosophies between the two agencies during this era was 
the Schering-Plough case where the FTC lost an attempted monopolization case at 
the appellate level and unsuccessfully sought certiorari in the Supreme Court alone 
and against the express opposition of the Justice Department.  FTC v. Schering-
Plough, 402 F. 3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).  Another 
example was the refusal of the FTC to sign onto the now withdrawn report issued by 
the Antitrust Division proposing overly narrow standards for the imposition of 
liability for unilateral conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.  
94 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era,  
Remarks as Prepared for the Center for American Progress (May 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.htm; see also 
Spencer Weber Waller & Jennifer Woods, Antitrust Transitions, 32 WORLD COMP. 
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the same developments.  This continuing oscillation is another 
explanation for the very rare interaction for two fields both intimately 
concerned about corporate actors and their interaction in the 
marketplace.   
The current equilibrium, if it holds, is an equally rare 
opportunity to do better.95  When antitrust and corporate governance 
were out of synch it was widely believed that these two bodies of law 
were substitutes.96  Today, the better view is that they are 
complements and should operate in a coordinated and consistent 
manner to promote the interests of both consumers and shareholders.97 
 
IV. Towards A More Meaningful Interaction  
  
This section looks at several of the more obvious and important 
areas where an understanding of agency costs can inform the broader 
market competition questions that antitrust law addresses, and vice-
versa.  Woven throughout the discussion is the critical area of 
corporate compliance law where the internal structure and operation of 
corporate entities can affect their ability to comply with antitrust (and 
other legal and regulatory schemes) and detect violations when they 
occur. 
                                                          
95 There will always be areas of corporate governance like executive 
compensation, board selection and retention, shareholder voting, and accounting 
rules and audit procedures that only rarely implicate competition policy.  Although 
beyond the scope of this article, Professor Macey has identified the “cartelization” of 
stock exchanges, accounting firms, and credit rating agencies as an additional source 
of poor corporate governance.  MACEY, supra note 6, at 105-17.  By “cartelization”, 
Professor Macey appears to mean increased concentration and the creation of 
regulatory barriers to entry, rather than a literal private conspiracy in restraint of 
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Congress has recognized at least one piece of this competition-corporate 
governance puzzle with the passage of the Credit Rating Duopoly Relief Act, H.R. 
2990, 109th Cong. (2009).  The effect of this statute is still uncertain, but the dismal 
performance of the credit rating industry in the financial crisis of 2008 suggests that 
neither competition nor corporate governance has improved in this sector.   John P. 
Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the ‘Worldwide Credit Crisis’: The Limits of 
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (2009). 
96 Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. 
ECON. 211 (1950). 
97 D. Danny Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate 
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Part A introduces the general standards for corporate 
compliance.  Part B examines interlocking directorates, the only 
current area where Congress has directly addressed the antitrust-
corporate governance intersection by statute.  Part C looks at cartel 
policy, where better governance principles and compliance policies 
can deter and prevent the type of hard-core antitrust violations that 
constitute criminal violations for the corporation and its officers, 
directors, and employees.  Part D looks beyond past cartel issues into 
the murkier areas of the anticompetitive agreements which are not 
illegal per se, but are judged on a case-by-case basis under the Rule of 
Reason.  Part E looks at merger policy, an area where greater attention 
to corporate governance concerns illustrates certain weaknesses in 
current antitrust thinking.  Finally Part F analyzes the area of 
monopolization and attempted monopolization where the uncertainties 
of what constitutes market power and its unlawful exercise are 
sufficiently vague and nuanced that the current regime of the business 
judgment rule normally seems appropriate. 
 
A. Corporate Compliance 
Although most courts historically rejected imposing a 
requirement that boards institute compliance programs because 
directors “are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their 
subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that 
something is wrong,”98 recent decisions signify a shift in such 
ideology.   First, Allis-Chalmers established a duty to act when 
directors become aware of “red flags,” e.g., illegal or wrongful 
activities.99  This decision was Delaware’s first addressing to what 
extent directors must ensure legal compliance of the companies 
officers and employees.100 
A derivative suit alleged that the directors of Allis-Chalmers 
were liable for their employee’s violations by reason of their failure to 
take action to uncover and prevent antitrust violations on the part of 
any employees of Allis-Chalmers.101  The facts demonstrated that the 
directors had no actual knowledge of any antitrust violations or even 
                                                          
98 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (citing Briggs v. 
Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891)). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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reason to know of any potential wrongdoing until officials announced 
an investigation of the company.102  Nevertheless, the plaintiffs 
argued, in the alternative, that, by virtue of their fiduciary duties, 
directors were bound to put a compliance system into effect, which 
would bring misconduct to their attention.103 
The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed.  The court reasoned 
that precedent rejected such a burden, and noted that directors may 
rely on the honesty and integrity of corporate employees in the 
absence of red flags.104  Thus, the Allis-Chalmers directors were not 
liable for the actions of their subordinates.   
Allis-Chalmers broke significant ground by recognizing that a 
director’s fiduciary duties could include the duty to monitor, however, 
it provided little incentive for directors to actually “monitor.”  
Notably, the court, in creative language, refused to impose a duty “to 
install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out 
wrongdoing.”105  In other words, there was no duty to institute 
corporate compliance systems.  In 1996 this changed. 
In a groundbreaking shift in corporate governance, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery in the Caremark litigation expanded a 
director’s duty to act not only when exposed to obvious signs of 
wrongdoing, but to be informed and be vigilant to uncover 
wrongdoing.106  The decision stemmed from a federal investigation of 
“kickback” payments to physicians in exchange for patient referrals.  
Caremark eventually entered into a $250 million settlement.  At which 
time, Chancellor Allen, the author of the decision, saw an opportunity 
to require directors to oversee legal issues.107   
In approving the settlement, Chancellor Allen demonstrated 
that directors could no longer assume that the corporation was in 
compliance with the law.  Rather, they have a “duty to attempt in good 
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, 
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so 
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director 
                                                          
102 Id. at 128-29. 
103 Id. at 130.   
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (1996). 
107 Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone:  
Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323-346 (J. Mark 
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liable for losses caused by non-compliance.”108  Chancellor Allen 
treated this duty as an extension of directors’ duty to act in good faith, 
preventing courts from second guessing directors’ business 
decisions.109 
To show bad faith, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the board 
failed in a “sustained or systematic”110 fashion.  This includes an “utter 
failure” by the board to develop a reasonable information-reporting 
system.111  An actual failure to prevent wrongdoing does not, by itself, 
indicate that a board failed in its duty to monitor.112  Even a grossly 
unreasonable failure to act does not meet the bad-faith threshold.113 
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court reinforced, but 
narrowed, the Caremark decision, placing directors’ duty to monitor in 
line with the duty of good faith, a subset of the duty of loyalty.114  As a 
result, directors breach their duty to monitor when they either “utterly 
fail[] to implement any reporting or information system or controls” or 
if they “consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems 
requiring their attention.”115 
Stone stemmed from a derivative suit brought by AmSouth 
Bancorporation shareholders against the board for allowing employees 
to violate reporting requirements under the federal Bank Secrecy Act.  
Although the court affirmed Caremark’s good faith standard, it also 
identified a scienter requirement, stating that “imposition of liability 
requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not 
discharging their fiduciary obligations.”116  
These key cases and the numerous ones that have followed in 
their wake establish three key principles: (1) a plaintiff must show 
scienter–that the board acted with the actual or constructive 
knowledge that its inaction would harm the corporation, (2) the board 
is responsible for preventing wrongful or illegal acts, but (3) is not 
                                                          
108 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
109 Id. at 967.  
110 Id. at 971. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 972. 
113 Id. at 970-71. 
114 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).  See generally Symposium: Good Faith After 
Disney, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 421-670 (2010-11). 
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responsible for monitoring outcomes of decisions of previous 
boards.117 
Recent cases indicate a greater willingness to infer knowledge 
of wrongdoing.  In American International Group v. Greenberg, the 
court inferred the defendants’ knowledge from their high level 
management positions, because it was unlikely that illegal transactions 
would have occurred without their knowledge.118 
The duty of care generally requires that directors act in good 
faith and with the degree of diligence, care, and skill that an ordinarily 
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances.  At the 
same time, the business judgment rule “is a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”119  The rule 
effectively prevents the judiciary from reviewing, after the fact, the 
merits of most board’s business decisions.  Accordingly, a plaintiff 
challenging a corporate board’s business decision(s) made on an 
informed and good faith basis bears the burden of rebutting the 
business judgment rule presumption.120   
 The business judgment rule does not protect all corporate 
action, however.  First, the rule does not apply if a plaintiff can show 
that directors acted with self-interest (self-dealing).121  Second, the 
rule does not apply where directors abdicate their responsibility or 
when they failed to act, as in duty to monitor cases.122  Third, the rule 
does not apply to decisions lacking a rational business purpose.123  
Courts make this determination from the vantage point of the directors 
at the time they made the decision, not with hindsight.124  Fourth, the 
                                                          
117 Eric. J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719 (2009). 
118 60 A.D.3d 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).  But see In re Citigroup, Inc. 
Shareholders Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124-26 (Del Ch. 2009)(adopting less 
expansive view of inferring knowledge of wrongdoing). 
119 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
120 Id. at 805. 
121 Id. at 812. 
122 Aronson, 473 A. 2d at 813. 
123 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n. 66 (Del. 2000)(summarizing the 
business judgment rule and relevance of a rationale business purpose in decisions by 
directors). 
124 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
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rule does not protect decisions involving gross negligence.125  In the 
event that the business judgment rule does not apply, the board must 
prove the “entire fairness” of the transaction.126   
The business judgment rule rests largely on the presumption 
that directors (business professionals) – rather than courts – boast the 
business acumen required to sufficiently assess the economic risk 
associated with their often complex decisions.127  The rule protects 
directors from liability for errors or mistakes in judgment, thereby 
ensuring corporate freedom to make their own rational and informed 
judgments without fear of backlash with the benefit of hindsight.  
Thus, the rule permits immunizing the substance of a decision derived 
from diligent and informed analysis.128  “Process” is essential in 
determining whether the board acted with due diligence. 
 When applied to antitrust, this produces critical but unresolved 
issues.  First, what is a sufficient monitoring system so that the board 
has, in good faith, required monitoring and compliance systems that 
reasonably can be expected to deter, detect, and prevent serious 
antitrust violations by the officers, employees, and directors of the 
corporation?  Second, what are the red flags necessary for the board to 
take further action when unlawful conduct may have occurred?  
Finally, how do the duties of care, the requirement of adequate 
monitoring and compliance systems, and the business judgment rule 
interact when the board fails to take action and the corporation is 
subsequently found guilty or liable, or chooses to settle allegations of 
substantial antitrust wrong doing? 
 The case law and commentary provides surprisingly few 
clues.129  The answer is likely to be different depending on which area 
of antitrust and which type of violation is at issue.  The following sub-
                                                          
125 Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see generally Steven A. 
Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASH. L. REV. 343 (2006). 
126 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
127 See, e.g., L. Corp. Offs. & Dirs.: Rts., Duties & Liabs. § 2:10 (2009); Daniel 
Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. L. 1437, 
1441 (1985). 
128 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 US 132 (1891). 
129 In contrast, the issue has received much more comprehensive treatment in the 
United Kingdom where the UK competition enforcer, the Office of Fair Trading, has 
produced an excellent recent comprehensive study of corporate compliance in 
competition law; see Office of Fair Trading, Drivers of Compliance and Non-
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sections discuss the nature of red flags and board duties for the most 
common types of antitrust violations and suggest that the highest 
duties should be imposed with respect to cartel type violations, the 
least for monopolization type offenses, and an intermediate standard 
for mergers. 
 
B. Interlocking Directorates 
The only direct statutory interplay between corporate 
governance and competition policy can be found in Section 8 of the 
Clayton Act which states: 
 
No person shall, at the same time, serve as a director or 
officer in any two corporations (other than banks, 
banking associations, and trust companies) that are - 
(A) engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and 
(B) by virtue of their business and location of 
operation, competitors, so that the elimination of 
competition by agreement between them would 
constitute a violation of any of the antitrust 
laws…130 
 
This provision is limited to corporations above a certain size and 
where competitive sales are above a certain threshold.131  Only 
interlocking directorates between horizontal competitors are covered 
by this provision, despite its wording suggesting that interlocking 
directorates between vertically related corporations would be subject 
                                                          
130 18 U.S.C. § 19 (2010). 
131 These limits are indexed to inflation and currently Section 8 of the Clayton 
Act only applies if the corporations have capital, surplus and undivided profits above 
$25,841,000 each and where competitive sales are above $2,584,100 and at least 2 
per cent of that corporation's total sales or the competitive sales of each corporation 
are at least 4 per cent of that corporation's total sales. COMMISSION ANNOUNCES 
REVISED FILING THRESHOLDS FOR CLAYTON ACT ANTITRUST REVIEWS; FOLLOWING 
REVIEW, COMMISSION DECIDES TO RETAIN THE AMPLIFIER RULE; FTC APPROVES 
FINAL CONSENT ORDERS IN CASES AGAINST SIX BUSINESSES THAT CLAIMED TO 
COMPLY WITH AN INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY FRAMEWORK; FTC APPROVES FINAL 
CONSENT ORDER IN MATTER CONCERNING WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS AND 
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to this provision as well.132  Section 8 also does not reach interlocking 
directorates between bank and non-bank corporations.133  Although 
there are occasionally boundary issues as to whether corporations 
should be deemed horizontal competitors,134 or whether the statute 
reaches situations where the corporation own subsidiaries which 
compete, the statute is straightforward enough.  It thus represents a per 
se ban on a limited number of types of horizontal interlocking 
directorates.135  No proof of competitive effects is required. 
 As a result, individuals and corporations simply act 
accordingly in the real world. There is not that much litigation.136  
When disputes arise, the remedy is normally the resignation of a 
director from one of the two competing enterprises or occasionally the 
divestiture of a business line so the firms are no longer competing and 
no longer subject to these provisions.  Sometimes, the firms act 
preemptively; sometimes the remedy is embodied in a consent decree 
depending on the stage of the investigation or litigation. 
 Most recently, Eric Schmidt, then the CEO of Google, 
resigned as a director of Apple to resolve questions whether his dual 
service on both company’s boards violated this provision.  Press 
reports indicate that the FTC is continuing to investigate whether other 
board level interlocks between these two actual and potential 
competitors raises similar issues.137 
                                                          
132 Paramount Pictures, 93 F.T.C. 325, 379 (1979), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 
647 F. 2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981).  
133 BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122 (1983); see generally 
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 10, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 
UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT (1984); Arthur H. Travers, Jr.,  Financial 
interlocks After the BankAmerica Case, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 1067 (1985); Amy 
Corton, BankAmerica v. United States – Legitimizing Bank-NonBank Interlocks, 33 
EMORY L.J. 1103 (1984). 
134 See Benjamin M. Gerber, Enabling Interlock Benefits While Preventing 
Anticompetitive Harm: Toward an Optimal Definition of Competitors Under Section 
8 of the Clayton Act, 24 YALE  J. REG. 107 (2007). 
135 See William C. MacLeod, Interlocks at the Federal Trade Commission: 
Room for Reason in a “Per Se’ Statute?, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 1077 (1985); Note, 
Clayton Act Prohibition of Interlocking Directorates in Industrial or Commercial 
Corporations, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 130 (1954). 
136 Cases involving challenges to interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the 
Clayton Act are collected in I ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENT 426-31 (6th ed. 2007). 
137 Despite Google’s Schmidt resignation from Apple board, FTC investigation 
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 Preventing conflicts of interest and creating proper 
incentives for directors underlie this entirely sensible, but limited 
provision.  Interlocking directorates between competitors can pose 
both competition and corporate governance problems.  They can 
exacerbate the agency cost problems when a director’s decisions can 
benefit his own interests in his other role with the competitor rather 
than serve the best interests of the shareholders at the company where 
he serves as a director.  At an extreme, they can be a direct violation of 
the duty of loyalty for either or both of the corporations where the 
director serves.   
 These concerns must also be balanced against the value of 
knowledgeable experienced directors who have the ability to play an 
important engaged role as outside directors to minimize the agency 
costs that is the avowed goal of corporate governance law in the first 
place.138  If the statute operates as intended, obviously a certain 
number of highly qualified directors will be excluded and publicly 
traded companies will have to find outside directors from a somewhat 
different pool of candidates. 
 On the competition side of the fence, the dangers can be 
equally straightforward.  Interlocking directorates could facilitate 
outright collusion,139 but could also be a facilitating mechanism for the 
exchange of information or other means of oligopolistic coordination 
and tacit collusion.  Interlocking directorates can also affect key board 
level decisions involving mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, entry 
into new markets, innovation initiatives, and other key strategic 
determinations that can affect the competitive efforts of one or both of 
the affected firms.140 
 The current statute, while not perfect, is nonetheless an 
appropriate compromise.  It can be both over- and under-inclusive in 
particular settings.  Section 8 also is not precise in the definition of 
competing firms which raises issues for companies with operations in 
multiple markets and for companies where the boundaries of even 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.macdailynews.com/index.php/weblog/comments/despite_googles_schmid
t_resignation_from_apple_board_ftc_investigation_cont/. 
138 Gerber, supra note 134, at 112-15. 
139 Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 517, 
583-84 (2004) (discussing historical use of interlocking directorates as trust 
facilitating device). 
140 Mehdi Farhadi, How Major Public-Listed Blue Chip Enterprises in Germany 
Protect Themselves from Hostile Takeovers by Foreign Investors Through Networks 
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specialized operations are evolving rapidly, as in the high-tech 
sector.141  However, further precision would probably come at such a 
high cost that the incremental gains would not be worthwhile for either 
competition policy or corporate governance.  What emerges most is 
the value of first Congress, and then the courts and commentators, 
identifying an important, but limited, area where there is real utility 
from thoughtfully addressing previously these two separate legal 
spheres in a unified manner.  If the prohibition of interlocking 
directorates is a qualified success, then the failure to integrate 
corporate governance and competition policy in more pressing areas of 





Perhaps the most important area of corporate compliance 
relates to the deterrence, prevention, detection, and response to 
credible allegations of price fixing, bid rigging, and related cartel 
behavior.  These are the hard-core cartel offenses that are per se 
unlawful and normally prosecuted as criminal violations by the 
Antitrust Division.  The conspiracy itself is the offense and no proof of 
effect is required.142  Essentially these per se unlawful conspiracies are 
presumed unreasonable and no rebuttal evidence is permitted as to 
their intended or actual effect.143  The Supreme Court has gone so far 
as to state in dicta that cartels are “public enemy number one” for 
antitrust purposes.144 
 Whether or not this is literally true,145 criminal conviction (and 
even investigation) holds heavy consequences for the corporations and 
individuals involved.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes an antitrust 
crime a felony.146  The criminal penalties for a corporation are fines up 
to the higher of $100,000,000 or double the gain or loss involved in 
the offense.147  Fines for cartel offenses have reached as high as 
                                                          
141 Gerber, supra note 134, at 118-20. 
142 Socony-Vacuum v. United States, 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). 
143 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
144 Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
145 Maurice Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 497 (2009). 
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$500,000,000 and there are dozens of fines in excess of 
$100,000,000.148   
 For individuals, the monetary penalties are smaller, but the 
stakes even higher.  Individuals, unlike corporations, are subject to 
imprisonment and not just heavy fines.  A violation of Section 1 can 
result in a prison term of up to ten years.149  Virtually every conviction 
in modern times has resulted in a prison term for corporate employees, 
officers, and directors, ranging from relatively low level employees to 
Presidents and CEOs.150  The longest prison term to date has been 46 
months.151 
 The criminal prosecution is often just the beginning of the 
troubles for the firms involved.  A conviction or guilty plea in a 
government criminal case is prima facie evidence of liability in any 
follow up civil treble damage litigation who would then need only to 
prove standing, causation, and damages in order to receive treble 
damages, attorneys fees, and costs.152  Many of these actions are filed 
in the form of a class action which further raises the stakes.  
Settlements by co-defendants are deducted pre-trebling.153  In Pari 
delicto defenses are not allowed.154  Liability is joint and several.155  
Contribution claims among defendants are not allowed,156 although 
contractual judgment sharing agreements have been allowed.157  
Further, to the extent that an antitrust can be deemed an intentional 
crime or tort, antitrust judgments may not be insurable.158 
                                                          
148 Hammond, supra note 32, at 5-6. 
149 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
150 THE INFORMANT! (Howard Braunstein et. al. 2009) (fictionalized account of 
actual international cartel agreement for food additives reaching into higher 
executive and board ranks of conspirators). 
151 JAMES ATWOOD, KINGMAN BREWSTER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, II 
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 15.3 (3d ed. 1997 & annual supp.). 
152 15 U.S.C. § 5. 
153 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1969).  See 
generally LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN G. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: 
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 17.8b (2d ed. 2006). 
154 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968). 
155 Burlington Industries v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 393 (4th Cir. 1982). 
156  Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
157 Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment Sharing Agreements, 2009 DUKE L. J. 747. 
158 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS, LAW 
AND STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS Ch. 15 (1994).  Some states 
would go further and bar insurability of antitrust treble damage verdicts as punitive 
damages.  Id. at 7.3, & 15.3.  See generally 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:115 
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One of the government’s most effective anti-cartel tools is the 
amnesty and leniency program which has been widely copies abroad.  
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Department of Justice adopted a set 
of formal written guidelines setting forth when the government would 
grant immunity for cartel participants who informed the Antitrust 
Division of cartel activity and provided truthful cooperation going 
forward.159  Under the amnesty and leniency program, corporations 
and individuals receive immunity from criminal prosecution if: 
  At the time the corporation comes forward to report 
the illegal activity, the Division has not received 
information about the illegal activity being reported 
from any other source; 
  The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal 
activity being reported, took prompt and effective 
action to terminate its part in the activity; 
  The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor 
and completeness and provides full, continuing and 
complete cooperation to the Division throughout the 
investigation; 
  The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate 
act, as opposed to isolated confessions of individual 
executives or officials; 
  Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to 
injured parties; and 
  The corporation did not coerce another party to 
participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the 
leader in, or originator of the activity.160 
 
If a corporation qualifies for leniency, directors, officers, and 
employees of the corporation also will not be charged criminally if 
they admit their wrongdoing with “candor and completeness” and 
continue to assist the Division throughout the investigation.161 
                                                          
159 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (1993), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Individual Leniency Policy (1994), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.htm. 
160 Corporate Leniency Policy, supra note 159, at Section A.  Alternative 
discretionary conditions for granting immunity are set forth in Section B of the 
policy. 





 Corporate Governance and Competition Policy 30 
 Immunity from criminal prosecution will not shield the 
corporation from private damage suits.  In fact, it normally makes 
settlement of subsequent private litigation for cartel overcharges 
almost inevitable since the corporation has confessed its guilt and 
provided assistance to the Justice Department in the prosecution of the 
other cartel members.  In order to enhance the incentives to take 
advantage of the amnesty and leniency program and turn against other 
cartel members, Congress subsequently passed legislation that 
provided that cooperating firms normally would only be liable for 
single damages for private litigation in connection with cartel activity 
subject to a grant of immunity under the amnesty and leniency 
program.162  As a result of the combined incentives of the amnesty and 
leniency program, the vast majority of recent large domestic and 
international cartel cases have originated from cartel members who 
have defected and disclosed the cartel to the Antitrust Division 
pursuant to the program.163  At least thirty foreign jurisdictions have 
adopted similar programs further increasing the incentives to turn in 
fellow cartel members for immunity or leniency, but complicating the 
process of coordinating the different procedural and substantive 
requirements of each program.164 
The growth of amnesty and leniency programs is just part of 
the growing international consensus that price fixing, bid rigging, and 
related offenses should be deemed hard-core cartel offenses and 
should be illegal under national or regional law and vigorously 
investigated and punished by the relevant competition authority.  For 
example, the thirty-plus nations of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) recognized that hard core 
cartels are the most egregious violations of competition law and that 
effective action against hard core cartels is particularly important from 
an international perspective.165  The 1998 OECD Recommendation 
                                                          
162 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 Extension 
Act, Public Law 111-30, 123 Stat. 1775.  Limitation of liability to single damages is 
contingent on truthful cooperation by the corporation. 
163 Hammond, supra note 32, at 4. 
164 J. Anthony Chavez, International Cartel Enforcement: Creating a Fear of 
Detection, in ANTITRUST INSTITUTE 2010: DEVELOPMENTS & HOT TOPICS, 1811 
PLI/Corp 929 (2010). 
165 Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development,  
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advises member countries to ensure that their competition laws 
effectively halt and deter hard core cartels by providing for effective 
sanctions and adequate enforcement procedures and institutions to 
detect and remedy hard core cartels.166 
Most of the major competition law jurisdictions now take a 
similar tough stance on cartel activity.  Although the European Union 
does not criminalize cartel activity or impose individual liability, it 
does impose fines of up to 10% of the world-wide annual turnover of 
the enterprises involved.167  These fines often have equaled or 
exceeded the criminal fines imposed by the United States in 
connection with the same cartel operating in both jurisdictions.168  
Although penalties and the level of enforcement differ, an increasing 
number of countries including Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Brazil, and Australia, are enacting and enforcing criminal price fixing 
provisions169 and/or seeking to create meaningful private rights of 
actions for the victims of price fixing and related cartel activity.170 
The criminal penalties on corporations and other business 
entities, imprisonment of key corporate officers and employees, 
potential disqualification of directors, overall financial consequences, 
as well as collateral debarments from doing business with certain 
public sector customers are frequently material for the financial 
performance of the corporation and may be required to be reported to 
the SEC and disclosed to the public. This in turn raises additional 
concerns under federal securities regulation and increases the potential 
for shareholder derivative and class action litigation. 
This suggests that there are unique red flags associated with the 
role of corporate boards in connection with cartel type activity.  First, 
the decision to apply for leniency is normally a board decision.  
Second, for a board to consider, and then reject, applying for 
                                                                                                                                         
Session on 25 March 1998 [C/M(98)7/PROV]), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf. 
166 Id. 
167 Art. 23, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 
on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty, O.J. L 1/1 (Jan 1, 2003). 
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169 Chavez, supra note 163, at III G. 
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unconditional amnesty would be condoning a criminal felony and 
automatically constitute a breach of the board’s fiduciary duty.  The 
business judgment rule would not protect such a decision.171  Board 
members would be exposed to significant liability in shareholder 
derivative litigation and conceivably as aiding and abetting the 
conspiracy in the underlying antitrust violation.  In addition, to reject a 
chance at unconditional amnesty is to risk another member of the 
cartel having the opportunity to seek amnesty receive the benefits and 
place the first corporation in the difficult position of almost certainly 
having to defend both criminal and civil litigation with a different 
cartel member obliged to truthfully and fully cooperate with the 
government at every step of the process. 
But this first scenario of outright rejection of an opportunity for 
amnesty is both extreme and unlikely.  Intermediate scenarios include 
when it becomes publicly known that another member of the industry 
in the United States or abroad has sought or received amnesty in 
connection with cartel activity.  Once again, it is probably too late to 
take action, although the possibility of a discretionary amnesty 
application (or application in another jurisdiction) is still available.  
However, in the real world, amnesty is probably too late and the 
board’s choice is to contest liability if the facts and law warrant or to 
seek a guilty plea with a reduced sentence and fine as the only 
practical alternative. 
  Other real world variations of potential red flags for board 
consideration include the execution of a search warrant or dawn raid 
of company premises, the receipt of a grand jury subpoena, the receipt 
of a civil investigative demand, press reports of grand jury or civil 
antitrust investigations, the filing of a civil class action, individual 
treble damage, or civil governmental cases, a history of prior antitrust 
violations, the receipt of a demand letter threatening litigation, 
disturbing results from an antitrust audit or other internal investigation 
or compliance program, the surfacing of an internal whistleblower, 
customer complaints of anticompetitive conduct, and so on down to 
unsubstantiated rumor and innuendo.  In most of these variations, the 
more likely scenario is that a corporate board was not aware of the 
cartel activity or the corporation’s participation in the cartel until it is 
too late.  But the question for corporate governance, corporate 
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compliance, corporate responsibility, and director liability is what 
should the board have known and when should they have known it. 
Even in the absence of these legal and regulatory red flags, 
there are business, economic, and industry factors should trigger at 
least reflection by a corporate board whether something more needs to 
be done.  Antitrust economists are in broad agreement that some of the 
industry dynamics that are prone to collusion include a small number 
of players, a homogenous product, price transparency, widespread 
exchange of information among competitors, heavy contacts between 
competitors in a trade association or other context, and/or signaling 
through the press and public announcements about future pricing and 
production.172  When such factors are part of the daily life of the 
corporation and its competitors willful ignorance should not be a 
shield for liability. 
Cases like Caremark and Stone establish that the corporation 
should have meaningful effective compliance programs and the board 
should be aware of those programs and involved such that the 
compliance program functions properly.  No case suggests that the 
mere fact that illegal activity occurred, by itself, constitutes a breach 
of the board’s duties toward the shareholder no matter how dire the 
consequences to the corporation or the shareholders.  And yet, 
something more than setting up a compliance program in good faith 
and then ceasing to pay attention is required. 
However, the danger is that the current legal structure creates 
incentives to engage in what Daniel Sokol has dubbed “cosmetic 
compliance.”173  The risk is that the corporations will engage in just 
enough compliance efforts to avoid legal liability but not enough to 
actually detect anything, lest the board then be required to actually do 
something about it in order to avoid liability.174 
The federal criminal sentencing guidelines provide some 
additional guidance.175   These sentence guidelines were at one time 
mandatory, but now serve as voluntary guidelines to reduce sentencing 
                                                          
172 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 217-228 (1990). 
173 D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners 
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(2010)(forthcoming). 
174 Sokol, Cartels, supra note 172, at *45 & n. 269. 
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disparities for all federal criminal offenses.176  They indicate that the 
existence (or lack thereof) an effective compliance and ethics program 
will affect the culpability score of the corporate defendant which will 
in turn affect the amount of the applicable criminal fine for all federal 
corporate criminal convictions including antitrust.177  In addition the 
maintenance of an effective compliance and ethics program normally 
also will be a term of the probation of a corporate defendant.178 
In order to qualify as an effective compliance and ethics 
program, the organization must: 
 
1) Exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal 
conduct; and 
2) Otherwise promote an organizational culture that 
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law.179 
Due diligence in this context means that the board of directors, 
as the governing authority of the corporation “shall be knowledgeable 
about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program 
and shall exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the 
implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics 
program.”180  After establishing and promoting the program, the 
organization must also take reasonable steps to make sure that the 
program is being followed (including monitoring and auditing), 
periodically evaluating the program, utilizing statistical screening 
techniques of company data, creating mechanisms for the anonymous 
and/or confidential reporting of violations, and taking reasonable steps 
to respond appropriately to criminal conduct.181  Together, these 
requirements lay out a road map, but not an instruction manual, for 
corporate boards which are serious about effective compliance in the 
cartel context and other areas of federal criminal law for corporations. 
                                                          
176 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).   
177 Federal Sentencing Manual, supra note 174, at § 882.1. 
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There also is the possibility of director disqualification.  While 
SEC regulations bar any unfit person from serving in an executive 
position in a publicly held company,182 no such explicit statutory 
authority exists in the antitrust area in the United States.  However, 
director disqualification for competition law violations is subject to 
statute in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.183  In the 2002 UK 
Enterprise Act, there is the possibility of the Office of Fair Trading 
applying for a Competition Disqualification Order in addition to the 
other penalties provided for violation of the UK or EU competition 
rules.184  Here too, the ultimate test is whether the director is unfit to 
manage a company.185   
The OFT recently has issued revised guidelines indicting when 
they are likely to use these provisions in the future.186  Normally, the 
OFT will require a prior definitive decision that a competition 
violation187 has occurred, although it has the power in exceptional 
circumstances to proceed even in the absence of a prior violation.188  
The guidelines also suggest that director disqualification normally will 
be sought only for the more serious competition violations.189 
While the director disqualification process is likely to be used 
for situations where the director has actively participated in the 
violation, the more interesting sections of the guidelines pertain to 
those directors who “ought to have known” about the violations.190  
While no bright line rule is possible, the OFT will take into account 
such factors as the director’s role, position, knowledge, skill, 
experience, responsibilities and available information, as well as the 
relationship between those  roles and factors and the persons 
                                                          
182 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2006). 
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responsible for the violations.191  While this is not inconsistent with 
the general guidelines provided by cases like Caremark,192 it is more 
specific, more focused on competition issues, and represents a middle 
ground between draconian personal liability and virtual immunity 
under the US business judgment rule. 
There are no equivalent statutes or guidelines in the United 
States for competition offenses.  Seeking such a statutory amendment 
would be helpful, but appears to be politically unrealistic.  Even in the 
absence of specific statutory authority, there is the possibility of 
barring certain directors, officers and employees from the company or 
industry for varying lengths of time as part of court judgment and 
consent decrees for fraud and serious regulatory violations.193  From 
time to time, guilty pleas in antitrust cases have included similar 
language, but no systematic practice or plan appears to be at work.194  
Formal or informal versions of the UK statute and OFT guidelines 
would go a long way to filling the void left by state and federal law 
when corporate boards have failed to act because they failed to notice 
that anything was amiss until it was too late.  As Douglas Ginsburg 
and Joshua Wright further note, increasing personal responsibility 
(rather than corporate fines) may be the only way to both increase 
deterrence and minimize agency costs.195 
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Another key appears to be in the creation of a meaningful 
compliance program both for antitrust and other legal and regulatory 
risks.196  Although theoretically having a compliance program and 
then violating it could cut against a corporation or director, in practice 
it does not work that way.  Both the US sentencing guidelines and the 
OFT director disqualification guidelines provide benefits and 
protections to corporations that have such programs and do not impose 
special burdens on the officers and directors who create or supervise 
those good faith compliance programs. 
The ultimate question is what types of cartel red flags should a 
board ignore at its peril?  When ought a board to know that something 
is amiss?  What should be the penalties if they violate these duties?  
No bright line rules emerge for the honest and well meaning board 
member that has not actually participated in the violation.  However, 
the case law leaves much to be desired and comparisons with foreign 
practice and other areas of US law enforcement and regulatory 
experience require particularization for the competition area. 
At a minimum, directors need to be aware of the per se 
illegality and penalties for price fixing, bid rigging, market division, 
customer allocation and similar cartel activity.  No officer or director 
can participate in such activity, cover up in such activity, or knowingly 
allow any person to do so on behalf of the company.  Board members 
must create meaningful corporate compliance programs, relying on 
trained professionals, to deter, prevent, and detect such activity and 
ensure that such programs are instituted and taken seriously at every 
level of the corporation.  Training must be regular and ongoing at all 
levels of the corporation.  Compliance audits, screening techniques, 
and revisions to the compliance program will be required from time to 
time.  Whistleblowers must be encouraged and not punished.  Credible 
complaints of wrongdoing from any source must be taken seriously.  
Prompt action by the board will be required if credible allegations of 
violations appear from any of these sources.   
When such vigilance is present, then board members should be 
protected from personal liability and the corporation from shareholder 
litigation when genuinely unexpected violations prove to have 
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occurred.  When such vigilance is lacking, officers, directors, and 
corporations should not be able to hide behind overly generous 
protections from state corporate law doctrines designed to address 
more mundane duties and harms. 
 
 
D. Governance and the Rule of Reason 
 
Corporate governance issues affect a host of other issues also 
governed by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Any agreement which 
unreasonably restricts competition is unlawful under Section 1.  As 
discussed above, only a handful of agreements are per se unreasonable 
and normally prosecuted criminally.  The rest are judged under a 
broader rule of reason analysis on a case-by-case basis and are the 
subject of civil litigation if challenged by either the government or 
private parties. 
Corporate governance issues arise both as to whether there is 
even an agreement between two economically independent economic 
actors and whether any such agreements unreasonably restrict 
competition.  For example, most sports leagues are comprised of 
individual franchises owned by competing owners or groups.  These 
economically independent (but interdependent) teams compete both on 
the field and off the field economically, but cooperate in the creation 
and maintenance of the league itself.  As a result most sports leagues 
are subject to normal antitrust review unless protected by a statutory or 
judicial immunity.197 
In contrast, several professional sports leagues have organized 
themselves as single entities owning all franchises and player rights in 
order to avoid even constituting a “contract, combination or 
conspiracy” within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The 
most prominent of these peculiar structures for a sports league 
                                                          
197 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996)(particular practices of NFL 
immune from antitrust laws under labor exemption); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 
463 U.S. 1311 (1984)(NCAA television rules subject to Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act but should be judged under truncated version of rule of reason); Radovich v. 
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)(NFL enjoys no special antitrust 
immunity); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 
(1922)(professional baseball not interstate commerce and therefore beyond scope of 
commerce clause and Sherman Act; Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 553 
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premised on competition between teams was Major League Soccer 
which switched to a more traditional ownership structure several years 
after its creation over concerns that the relative lack of success of the 
business model in comparison to the minimal risks associated with 
being subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.198  Similar issues were 
raised in the recent Supreme Court American Needle decision where 
NFL Properties and its licensing operations was held to be an 
agreement within the meaning of Section 1 since it involved decisions 
by economically independent actors.199  
Corporate governance can also affect not just whether Section 
1 of the Sherman Act applies, but what test will be applied in judging 
the legality of the agreement.  The Supreme Court in its unanimous 
decision in American Needle was clear that some types of agreements 
are necessary in order to create professional sports and other joint 
enterprises in the first place.200  As a result some form of the rule of 
reason must be applied to such agreements and most will be held not 
to unreasonably restrict competition after a full examination of the 
pro- and anti-competitive aspects of the particular agreement.201 
These types of corporate governance issues came to the 
forefront of antitrust in the Visa/MasterCard litigation brought by both 
the federal government and in massive private treble damage antitrust 
class actions.  While the governance arrangements within and between 
Visa and Mastercard have been characterized as cartels,202 the reality 
is more complex. 
Both Visa and Mastercard were created as networks owned and 
operated by the member banks.  Both associations had boards of 
directors heavily weighted toward the largest banks issuing that 
particular credit card, which were often the same set of banks.  Each 
association had by-laws that permitted banks to issue both Visa and 
                                                          
198 See generally Chris Sagers, American Needle, Dagher, and the Evolving 
Antitrust Theory of the Firm: What Will Become of Section 1?, ANTITRUST SOURCE 
1 (August 2009). 
199 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-661.pdf (May 24, 
2010). 
200 __ U.S. at __, 130 S.Ct. 2201, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-661.pdf (May 24, 2010). 
201 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616625; Spencer 
Weber Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62 SMU L. REV. 693 (2009).  
202 See e.g., LLOYD CONSTANTINE, PRICELESS: THE CASE THAT BROUGHT DOWN 
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Mastercard cards, but prohibited banks from issuing any other credit 
cards, such as Discover or American Express.  The Antitrust Division 
challenged this governance structure as a civil rule of reason violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and sought injunctive relief.  The 
Second Circuit ultimately held this practice unlawful under the rule of 
reason.203 
In addition to complying with the terms of the judgment in the 
government case, Mastercard also fundamentally altered its ownership 
and governance structure through a subsequent initial public offering 
of stock.  At least part of the strategy behind the Mastercard initial 
public offering was an attempt to further reduce antitrust exposure by 
changing the fundamental nature of the entity from a cooperative 
enterprise run by competitors into a single economic actor owned by 
its share holders with the former member banks having no day-to-day 
control over network policies and operations.204 
The IPO established a relatively unusual governance structure 
which gives member banks more economic exposure than voting 
rights, “flipping the usual dual-class voting structure upside-down.”205  
Despite these helpful changes, numerous other policies and pricing 
decisions of the Visa and Mastercard networks have also been the 
subject of continued private antitrust challenge.206 
                                                          
203 United States v. Visa U.S.A., 344 F. 3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003). 
204 Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12 
HARV. NEG. L. REV.  137 (2007); Joshua Wright, Mastercard’s Single Entity 
Strategy, 12 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 225 (2007). 
205 Fleischer, supra note 204, at 138.  The IPO also established a charitable 
foundation which holds a significant block of Mastercard stock which Professor 
Fleischer contends provides both takeover protection and also gives the member 
banks continuing influence without antitrust exposure.  Id. 
206 In addition, to the government case discussed above, Visa and Mastercard 
have been subject to substantial private treble damage antitrust litigation relating to 
the interchange fees they charge merchants, requirements that merchants accept both 
credit and debit cards, and separate policies that required merchants not to impose 
their own fees for processing credit or debit transactions or providing discounts for 
cash purchases.  The largest of these private cases settled for approximately $3 
billion.  See CONSTANTINE, supra note 202.  For an overview of these antitrust issues 
see Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust Economics (and Law) of Surcharging Credit 
Card Transactions, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 343 (2009); Steven Semeraro, Credit 
Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 941 (2007); Adam J. Levitan, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for 
Control of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 425 (2007); Adam J. 
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The importance of corporate governance and antitrust was also 
illustrated in a far less well known case.  The company now known as 
Verisk was formed originally as Insurance Service Organization, Inc. 
(ISO) as a captive entity of the insurance industry and mutually owned 
by the leading competing firms in the industry.207   ISO drafted 
standardized language for commercial general liability insurance 
contracts and performed statistical and other data analyses to aid its 
owners, the insurers, in underwriting insurance policies.  As a matter 
of corporate governance, ISO was managed by a board of directors 
comprised of eighteen insurance executives and three non-insurers. 
The antitrust concerns arose out of the insurance crisis of the 
1980s where insurance premiums skyrocketed and state and local 
governments found it impossible to obtain certain types of insurances 
that had been previously offered.  Insurance companies and other parts 
of the industry insisted on more restrictive terms that limited existing 
coverage in different ways.  Prior policy terms were no longer made 
available. 
A coalition of state attorney generals and private parties sued 
US and foreign primary insurers, reinsurers, retrocessional insurance 
companies, and ISO for entering into a boycott and other unlawful 
agreements under the Sherman Act.  This litigation ultimately went to 
the Supreme Court establishing important law as to the scope of the 
antitrust exemption for the insurance and the international application 
of the Sherman Act.208 
As a result of the antitrust litigation, ISO entered into a consent 
decree with state attorneys and certain private plaintiffs in 1995 and 
was demutualized, creating a new ownership and governance structure 
that was independent from the insurers.209  The new board would 
consist of eleven members with seven non-insurers, three insurers, and 
one management director.210  The new independent board would elect 
                                                          
207 Questions of antitrust liability are complicated in this context by the 
existence of the McCarren-Ferguson Act which creates an exemption for the 
business of insurance (but not boycotts) where regulated by state law.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1012 (2010).  See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, MONOGRAPH NO. 24, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST 
LAW 133-60 (2007). 
208 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
209 In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation , MDL No . 767, (settlement agreement), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-
state/pdf/settlements/us-district/9th-circuit/insurance.pdf. 
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the future non-insurer directors and the insurer directors would elect 
the future insurance directors.211   The insurance industry was further 
barred from group participation in the affairs of ISO for a five year 
period.212 
Later renamed Verisk, the company continued to do business 
with the industry on a contractual basis for both drafting standard form 
contracts and data analysis and research.213   Freed from the 
conflicting incentives and cumbersome governance structure, the 
company prospered, deepened its product offerings, entered new 
markets, made a number of acquisitions and transformed itself into a 
far more profitable and dynamic entity.  By the end of 2008, the firm 
had annual revenues of $894 million, with revenues for the first half of 
2009 over $500 million, in comparison to $220 million at the time of 
the consent decree.214  Profits increased substantially over the same 
period as well.215  This in turn led to a successful initial public offering 
in October 2009,216 providing further indication that good competition 
policy and good corporate governance can go hand in hand. 
 
 
E. Mergers and Acquisitions 
In terms of the duties of the board, mergers fall somewhere 
closer to the need for vigilance against cartel activity and the relatively 
back seat role in terms of guarding against unlawful monopolization 
and abuse of dominance.  It is the traditional province of the board to 
carefully review any significant acquisitions outside the ordinary 
                                                          
211 Id. 
212 Id. at  ¶ 13. 
213 See Form S-1 REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 VERISK ANALYTICS, INC. (Aug. 12, 2008), available at 
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course of business.217  The board also is required to authorize any 
change in control of the corporation.218  In addition to questions of 
fairness and valuation of any acquisition, the board would normally be 
informed of any significant legal risks, including antitrust issues, in the 
proposed merger or acquisition and take those considerations into 
account in making its overall determination in approving or rejecting 
the transaction.219 
The antitrust remedy for an unlawful merger normally is the 
prospective blocking of the merger prior to closing or its restructuring 
to eliminate the effect on competition.220  Under this scenario, the 
planning and organization of the transaction obviously entail costs to 
the corporation as does the pre-merger notification and investigation 
of the transaction.  However, even the abandonment of the merger in 
the face of an inevitable antitrust challenge or the unsuccessful 
litigation of a court challenge does not involve imprisonment, criminal 
or civil fines, or even treble damages under most normal 
circumstances. While treble damages are theoretically possible for any 
person who has been injured in their business or property as a result of 
an antitrust violation, it is difficult to conceive of who could be so 
injured by a merger which was never consummated.  The federal 
government, state attorney generals, and private parties do however 
retain the right to challenge an unlawfully anticompetitive merger after 
consummation with the attendant disruptions and costs of 
unscrambling the omelet.221  But again, such litigation is rare, almost 
never successful by anyone other than the federal government, and the 
possibility of damages remote. 
Antitrust analysis for mergers and acquisitions is complicated 
and contingent on questions of market definition, market power, often 
technical theories of anticompetitive harm, the likelihood of market 
entry to offset potential harm, likely efficiencies, and occasionally, 
whether one or both of the merger parties constitute “failing firms.”222  
This is normally beyond the expertise of the board and often 
dependent on market facts outside control of corporation or even its 
merger partner. 
                                                          
217 FANTO, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, supra note 16, at § 5.3. 
218 Id. at § 5.3.1. 
219 Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Serv’s, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 
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However, there is mounting evidence from corporate finance 
community that suggests entire categories of deals are fraught with 
peril and more likely to destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder 
value.  A growing body of both empirical and theoretical literature has 
questioned the premises and results of an unconstrained market for 
corporate control being necessary or sufficient to solve the agency cost 
problems of corporate governance or create greater efficiency 
warranting deferential antitrust review of these same mergers.  Certain 
of this literature comes from the corporate finance and accounting 
fields.  Other sources come from the growing field of behavioral 
economics as applied to antitrust and finance.223  Together these 
sources and studies strongly suggest that certain categories of mergers 
destroy shareholder value and do little if anything to create meaningful 
efficiencies or enhance market competition.  At a minimum corporate 
governance and antitrust policy should be harmonized to strongly 
scrutinize and question transactions which work at cross-purposes to 
both bodies of law. 
 The corporate finance literature has suggested that certain 
identifiable categories of mergers typically destroy, rather than 
enhance, shareholder value.  Michael Jensen, a noted finance 
professor, observed relatively early on that value destroying mergers 
are more likely when managers of firms have unused borrowing power 
and large free cash flows.224  This is yet another illustration of the 
problem of agency costs and the tendency for managers to invest in 
below average or even value destroying mergers, rather than other 
investments and payouts that are more beneficial to shareholders. 
Professor James Fanto has summarized numerous studies from 
the more recent corporate finance literature to conclude that mega-
mergers of roughly equal firms financed through stock-for stock 
mechanisms are another type of transaction that is particularly suspect 
                                                          
223  See generally Amanda Reeves & Maurice Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 
INDIANA L. J. xx (2011)(Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 106), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1582720; 
Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 261 
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for destroying shareholder value.225  While the ill-fated AOL-Time 
Warner merger is the poster child for this type of transaction and 
unfortunate outcome,226 it is hardly alone.  Professor Fanto has 
identified numerous mergers such as Travelers-Citicorp, US West-
Qwest, and others as further examples of this trend.227  Fanto also 
notes that mergers dependent on poorly articulated synergies are also 
particularly suspect for their value destroying tendencies.228 
More recent studies have confirmed these dismal 
conclusions.229  A 2005 study by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
found that “from 1991 to 2001 (the 1990s) acquiring firms’ 
shareholders lost an aggregate $216 billion, or more than 50 times the 
$4 billion they lost from 1980 to 1990 (the 1980s), yet firms spent just 
6 times as much on acquisitions in the later period.”230  Most of the 
studies that suggest that mergers in general may create value focus on 
short-term changes in stock valuations of the acquired and acquiring 
companies following the public announcement of the transaction.  
These studies are not surprising since the acquired corporation’s stock 
is likely to increase in value given that the acquisition price is 
frequently a premium of the current stock price.  This increase is often 
greater than any decrease of the acquiring company’s stock price 
leading certain finance scholar’s to conclude that mergers (properly 
                                                          
225 Steven Lipin & Nikhil Deogun, Big Mergers of the 90s Prove Disappointing 
to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. , Oct. 30, 2000. 
226 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Ex-Time Warner chief apologises for ‘the worst 
deal of the century’, ft.com (Jan. 5, 2010); Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner 
Went So Wrong, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/business/media/11merger.html?hpw (Jan. 10, 
2010). 
227 James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law 
Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249 (2001); James A. Fanto, Quasi-
Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision Making, 
62 Ohio St. L.J. 1333 (2001). 
228 Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum, supra note 227, at 279. 
229 Dinara Bayazitova & Matthias Kahl & Rossen Valkanov, Which Mergers 
Destroy Value?  Only Mega-Mergers, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502385. 
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controlled for other variables) are efficiency enhancing and value 
enhancing.231 
Longer term studies of the actual performance of the deal years 
down the road reach very different conclusions. At a minimum, there 
is no significant support for the claim of broad efficiencies in the 
overall market for mergers.232  Too high a percentage of mergers and 
acquisitions end badly to take comfort in an unregulated market for 
corporate control as the answer to either the agency cost problem in 
corporate governance or the pursuit of an efficient competitive market 
for antitrust purpose.  Nor do these studies cast any doubt on the more 
particularized claims of Fanto and others that stock-for-stock mega-
mergers of equals remain the most suspect category of corporate 
transactions likely to produce massive wealth destruction for 
shareholders. 
Studies by the Federal Reserve Bank and other business 
scholars have suggested that there may be slightly different results for 
financial and banking mergers versus those in the industrial sector.233  
An analysis by Federal Reserve Bank staff of over 250 prior studies 
suggests that mergers in the finance and banking sector increased 
market power, produced no meaningful cost efficiencies, some 
efficiencies in payment systems, and some increased systematic 
risk.234  However, even in the banking sector sound governance 
mechanisms can be helpful in preventing bank executives from 
pursuing value destroying acquisitions.235 
Corporate governance principles as well as behavioral 
economics go a long way to explaining why corporations would 
consistently engage in behavior that is so harmful to shareholder 
                                                          
231 See e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. 
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interest.  The central insight going all the way to Berle and Means is 
that the incentives of officers and directors are not well aligned with 
those of shareholders.  Many scholars have focused on the incentives 
and rewards for corporate decision makers (the officers and 
particularly the CEO) to explain sub-optimal decisions and the 
continued biases toward mergers even when they are not value 
enhancing.  Studies from the 1980s through the present show a 
tendency of management to pursue acquisitions not in their 
shareholder interests in order to enhance their employment security, 
build empires, or simply expand the perquisites of office.236 
A variant of this explanation focuses on CEO autonomy, 
hubris, overconfidence, and narcissism as key explanations of the 
pursuit of mergers which both end poorly and can be predicted to do 
so.237  Similarly, weak corporate governance, lack of information, and 
the continued misaligned interests of directors beholden to corporate 
insiders suggest that the board of directors will not typically be in a 
position to stop these suboptimal acquisition plans once embarked 
upon by a powerful CEO.238 
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Behavioral economics also provides additional insight into 
why even well-meaning CEOs as the key players in this process may 
behave in such a fashion.  Behavioral economics documents through 
empirical research how actual human beings behave “quasi-rationally” 
rather than as the purely rational profit-maximizing entities assume in 
most traditional law and economics analyses.239  Instead of the purely 
rational profit maximizing individual or organization as posited by the 
rational choice theorists, behavioral economics seeks to document that 
decision makers tend to act with bounded rationality, bounded 
willpower, and bounded self-interest.240   
This behavioral research documents how both consumers and 
business decision makers are prone to predictable biases and use 
known heuristics and other shortcuts that produce sub-optimal 
decisions in the real world.  Some of the well-known biases and 
heuristics relevant to the decision to enter in mergers and acquisitions 
which frequently result in value destroying transaction include 
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myopia, loss aversion, endowment effects, status quo bias, 
extremeness aversion, over-optimism, hindsight bias, anchoring 
heuristics, availability heuristics, framing effects, representative bias, 
saliency effects, and others.241  One does not have to stretch to find 
numerous acquisitions driven by corporate decision makers suffering 
from over-optimism combined with numerous other all-too human 
tendencies to produce poorly conceived or over-priced acquisitions 
dependent on future synergies and efficiencies that were unachievable 
in the real world.  Richard Thaler has described these types of 
outcomes more generally as the Winner’s Curse.242 
Professor James Fanto surveys the securities filings for the ten 
largest mergers and acquisitions for 1998, 1999, and 2000 and 
concludes that most of these biases are present in the statements that 
managers and board members relied upon, were legally bound by, 
and/or used to persuade shareholders to approve the very largest 
transactions of those years.243  Most of these transactions were in turn 
among the most significant value destroying deals of their eras.244   
The Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz 2005 study notes that 
most of the largest value destroying acquisitions were the last in a 
series of acquisitions by the acquiring firm.245   This further suggests 
that the behavioral economics factor identified by Fanto and others, 
such as over-confidence, hind sight bias, and framing effects have 
played an important role in the destruction of shareholder wealth. 
These all too human tendencies combined with broad CEO 
autonomy and hubris produce incentives to pursue certain mergers and 
acquisitions which benefit no one other than senior management.  At 
the same time, a passive board of directors generally lacking in 
information and resources to challenge senior management similarly 
creates incentives to approve transactions which benefit few other than 
senior management. 
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Behavioral economics also provides additional insights into the 
critical issue of entry in the market where the merger has occurred.  
Once the government (or other plaintiff) has established that the 
merger is likely to produce anticompetitive effects,246 they have 
established a prima facie case that the transaction has violated Section 
7 of the Clayton Act.  The defendants may then rebut the plaintiff’s 
prima facie by showing that the merger nonetheless is unlikely to 
substantially harm competition.247 
The most typical evidence is that entry barriers to the affected 
market are so low that any post-merger price increase would be 
ineffective as a result of inducing timely, effective entry that would be 
profitable at even pre-merger prices.248  Professor Avishalom Tor has 
discussed how the insights of behavioral economics demonstrate that 
post-entry entry may be more prevalent than normally assumed, but it 
usually is less effective in disciplining the post-merger exercise of 
market power than normally believed.249  Conversely, Maurice Stucke 
provides numerous examples where even admittedly moderate low 
entry barriers are insufficient to prevent the exercise of market 
power.250 
Even accepting the need for a robust market for corporate 
control suggests the need for a continued antitrust presence that has 
been minimized in recent times.  If shareholders are going to receive 
maximum value, this requires rules which forbid collusive bidding for 
firms and limit the termination of auctions for firms once in play.251  It 
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also suggests limiting growing antitrust immunities in the securities 
law field and an ill-advised over-deference and reliance of the courts 
on securities regulators to maintain competition in order to maximize 
shareholder value in the takeover process.252 
If management cannot document convincingly why a particular 
new contemplated transaction of the type that typically has harmed 
shareholders in the past is different than its predecessor, then the board 
should have the duty to reject the deal as against the interests of 
shareholders.  If it fails to do so, the board should be held liable, not 
because the transaction turned out badly, but because the board 
ignored the red flags of the past and failed in its duty to adequately 
probe the new transaction in advance.  Similarly, if the principal 
reason that a transaction may enhance shareholder value is the likely 
increased exercise of market power, rather than dubious efficiency 
scenarios which typically have not panned out in the past, then the 
board must similarly do more before the transaction meets with their 
approval. 
 Broader changes could do much to better align the incentives 
of corporate boards to enter into mergers and acquisitions that both 
increase shareholder value and do not violate the antitrust laws and 
refrain from transactions that violate either or both legal regimes.  
Some commentators have proposed addressing this issue by amending 
the Clayton Act itself to shift the burden of proof and persuasion to the 
parties to a transaction to demonstrate the pro-competitive and 
efficiency enhancing aspects of the deal in order to win approval.253  
While this would certainly do the trick, such a wide ranging proposal 
raises serious issues beyond the unlikely chances of adoption by 
Congress.  The most noticeable is that it uses antitrust as a club to 
indirectly achieve governance goals where the real problem is that the 
deal is value destroying for shareholders, not that it harms competition 
for the public. 
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 More nuanced proposals on the corporate governance have 
included increased disclosure to the SEC and shareholders of 
efficiency claims when such claims are the basis for proceeding with 
the kind of stock for stock mega-deals that have proved so destructive 
of shareholder value in the past.254  To avoid pro-forma disclosure that 
does nothing to avoid deter such transactions, post-transaction 
reporting could be required to document where efficiencies and 
synergies have been realized and where such benefits have failed to 
materialize.255 
 The increased scrutiny for dubious value destroying deals 
should be on both the antitrust and corporate governance side.  There 
should be increased skepticism of these same types of transactions by 
the antitrust agencies and courts in addition to increased duties by 
corporate boards and disclosure to the securities agencies.   Antitrust 
and securities agencies should work hand-in-hand so that parties to 
mergers and acquisitions are providing consistent, truthful, and 
credible information to both sets of agencies just as the antitrust 
agencies currently do with their US sectoral regulators and their 
foreign counterparts.  If efficiency claims are weak, then parties have a 
more serious burden on the corporate governance side in explaining 
why the transaction enhances shareholder value.  And if the efficiency 
claims are weak, but the parties are claiming that the transaction 
nonetheless enhances shareholder value, then they have some antitrust 
explaining to do.  But they cannot have it both ways, or even worse 
proceed with transactions that fly in the face of the values promoted by 
both field of law, potentially harming both shareholders and 
consumers in the process. 
 
F. Abuse of Dominance 
 
Liability for abuse of dominance or monopolization is much 
more nuanced, almost never condemned without highly intensive 
inquiry into facts and economics effects, and less subject to 
international consensus as to theories of liability or remedy.  Such 
cases tend to be fewer and far between but much higher stakes as 
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illustrated by the Microsoft litigation in the United States,256 the 
European Union,257 and elsewhere around the world.258  In almost 
every jurisdiction, such investigations and cases begin with an 
examination of whether the firm in question has market power which 
is frequently dependant on difficult questions of market definition.  If 
significant market power is found, then the case then typically turns on 
very specific analysis of corporate behavior involving pricing, 
contracting practices, innovation programs, product design, and other 
questions of corporate strategy.  Standards for unlawful 
monopolization or abuse of a dominant position differ greatly between 
jurisdictions.259   
In the United States, liability increasingly turns on whether the 
anticompetitive harm outweighs the precompetitive benefits and 
efficiencies generated by the very same conduct at issue.  In modern 
times, penalties generally are behavioral, rather than structural.260  
Criminal enforcement is theoretically possible but has not been used 
since the late 1960s and appears to be abandoned as a realistic 
option.261 
 There are very few cases that deal with what should constitute 
the appropriate red flags in connection with potential liability for 
monopolization or abuse of dominance.  One of the few recent 
examples arose not surprisingly for the Intel Corp. which recently 
faced a series of competition law investigations and cases throughout 
the world.262 
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A shareholder derivative action alleged the board’s failure to 
prevent Intel from unlawfully monopolizing the market for computer 
microprocessors.263  The board of directors was ultimately successful 
because of the failure of the plaintiffs’ to plead particular facts 
demonstrating that the board had “actual or constructive knowledge” 
of the wrongdoing such that a failure to respond to the alleged red 
flags resulted in a breach of their fiduciary duties to properly monitor 
corporate compliance.264 
 The court noted that the plaintiffs did “little more than catalog 
the ongoing investigations into Intel’s wrongdoing” as an attempt to 
show that by virtue of the existence of numerous red flags, the 
directors faced “substantial likelihood” of personal liability.265  In 
other instances, the court found that some of the more specific 
allegations of red flags at the time of the decision were premature, and 
thus not grounds for liability.  This included an investigation by the 
European Commission that the court characterized as preliminary.266  
 In contrast, the court noted that the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission’s investigation and report on the anti-competitive 
activities of an Intel subsidiary in Japan could constitute a red flag.267  
However the fact that the board complied with the JFTC report 
showed that it had, in fact, responded to the red flag.  Additionally the 
plaintiff pointed to investigations by the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission and the New York Attorney General as constituting 
sufficient red flags.268  However, the court held that the plaintiffs had 
failed to adequately allege that the individual directors either knew or 
should have known about the illegal anticompetitive activities.269  
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Intel thus suggests that there is no reason to think board can 
micro-manage each decision of firm with market power, although the 
need for monitoring systems seems appropriate once market power is 
achieved or becomes a serious risk.  However, there are also areas of 
legitimate concern for dominant firms (like any other corporate entity) 
where board involvement is more traditional.  These can include 
acquisition of fringe and potential rivals, patterns of deception, 
broadly exclusionary conduct at the strategic level, rather than 
operational, level.  In short, these will be some areas where the 
business judgment rule does, and ought to, have some bite in terms of 
director involvement and ultimate liability as others where it should 
not suffice as a shield.270  For example, the UK’s statute and 
guidelines on director disqualification for competition violations state 
that the competition authority will take into account any genuine 
uncertainty over the legality of the conduct.271  One commentator 
expressed the hope that this would particularly be the case for abuse of 
dominance cases where “the boundaries between competing ‘on the 




Better understanding the ties between corporate governance 
and competition law should lead to important legal and policy 
changes.  Looking at the fields for their intersections, rather than their 
differences, opens up potential avenues for change on both sides of the 
existing fence. 
For directors, clear rules are better than complicated highly fact 
specific inquiries where after the fact second guessing may expose the 
directors to potential liability.  This is the basis for the business 
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judgment in the first place.  While a director obviously prefers no 
liability to the possibility of some liability, at the same time “no” is 
often better than “maybe” when viewed ex ante rather than ex post.  
While the existing statutory rules barring interlocking directorates 
between competing corporations are by no means perfect, they are 
workable clear rules that most businesses have little difficulty 
complying with, even though this provision undoubtedly produces 
both false positives and false negatives from time to time. 
Sometimes highly fact specific inquiries may be unavoidable.  
Clear-cut rules of when a board of directors must take action to 
prevent or report cartel activity do exist.  However, they are few and 
far between and often limited to situations where it is already too late 
from the point of view of either good governance or good competition 
policy.  Better incentives can be created for both good governance and 
effective compliance policies through individual director liability 
when reasonable steps are not taken to implement and monitor 
compliance programs which have a reasonable likelihood of deterring, 
detecting, and reporting hard-core activity.  As the business judgment 
rule teaches us, reasonable judgments should be deferred to, but the 
failure to exercise judgment is not worthy of deference and director 
liability may be appropriate where the failure to act has harmed the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Sub-optimal governance and 
decision making can be further promoted through statutory, judicial, or 
regulatory director disqualification where board members have been 
actively complicit or manifestly fallen down on the job.  Even in the 
fuzzier area of rule of reason liability, good governance structures can 
be designed to minimize both conflicting incentives and 
anticompetitive consequences. 
In the merger area, the corporate finance literature is 
convincing that mega-mergers on a stock for stock basis between 
roughly equal competitors are highly likely to destroy shareholder 
value.  There are a number of resulting helpful steps in both corporate 
governance law as well as antitrust.  On the corporate governance, the 
tendency of stock-for-stock mega-mergers among equals tend to be 
value destroying argues in favor of enhanced board duties in reviewing 
and approving such deals.273  It further suggests the need for enhanced 
securities disclosure to shareholders and regulators for such categories 
of value destroying deals or when parties to the transaction seek to rely 
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on efficiency claims.274  Securities and competition regulators equally 
must be more vigilant in scrutinizing such facile claims which rarely 
materialize in the real world.  Finally, some intermediate standard of 
review is called for in the courts beside near blind deference to board 
approval under the current formulation of the business judgment 
rule.275 
On the antitrust side, there needs to be increased attention to 
the type and categories of deals which prove to be value destroying 
and why.  There needs to be a better understanding of why predicted 
synergies and efficiencies more often than not are not achieved.  More 
importantly, there needs to be a better understanding of why certain 
deals may be value enhancing.  If there are not substantial synergies 
and efficiency gains, when is increased market power a more likely 
explanation? 
To be clear, mergers are not unlawful under the antitrust laws 
because they are stupid, or well-meaning but turn out badly.  They 
only violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act where they have the 
tendency to substantially harm competition.  However, the present 
situation is the worst of all possible worlds where certain types of 
mergers typically do nothing for shareholders nor for competition.  
Even worse, both bodies of law which purport to regulate such 
transactions have inadequate tools to help shareholders or competition 
in the market as a whole. 
Although it is not phrased this way, there is at least a soft 
presumption in both corporate governance and antitrust that most 
mergers and acquisitions are efficient and should be regulated 
primarily by market forces.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines come 
closest to this in stating that the “primary benefit of mergers to the 
economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential.”276  The building 
empirical and theoretical evidence from the economic, finance, and 
accounting world as well as behavioral economics suggests this is not 
inevitably so.277   
The key question is ex ante which type of mergers are likely to 
generate which types of efficiencies with what degree of probability 
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and what degree of magnitude?   To the extent that the economic, 
financial and corporate governance literature is persuasive that there 
are categories of mergers which are sufficiently value destroying and 
that the ex ante efficiency claims are strongly suspect then the 
agencies and the courts should be particularly suspect of such claims.  
As a result, any legal presumptions should run against such claims. 
These collective blind spots cannot be remedied without both 
communities investing in increased attention to each other’s literature, 
language, and expertise.  For the antitrust community this means 
greater investment in business theory as a supplement to the already 
substantial economic expertise brought to bear on merger analysis.  
For the corporate governance community, this means increased 
attention to the role of competitive and anti-competitive outcomes in 
formulating duties and responsibilities for corporate actors.  This 
suggests new possibilities of collaborative research and teaching 
across formerly separate law school subjects and between law school 
and business school faculty. 
Antitrust lawyers and policy makers can also play a 
meaningful role in corporate governance as competition advocates.  It 
is common practice for competition agencies, bar associations antitrust 
committees, specialty antitrust associations, practitioners, and 
academics to play an active role in competition advocacy more 
generally.278  This can be in the formulation of antitrust guidelines by 
federal, state and foreign agencies and/or formulation of policies and 
rules by sectoral regulators at the federal, state, and local levels.  Such 
competition advocacy must be extended to related issues in corporate 
governance when government and private groups are formulating 
policies that seek to ameliorate (or worsen) the conflicting incentives 
and agency costs that lie at the heart of corporate governance.  Only in 
such a world of deep interaction and continued inter-disciplinary 
learning will both shareholders and consumers benefit from efficient 
and shareholder oriented public corporations operating in a more 
consumer friendly competitive economy. 
                                                          
278 See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government 
Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119 (2009); 
Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 951, 957-59 
(2008);  James C. Cooper, Todd J. Zywicki & Paul A. Pautlier, Theory and Practice 
of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005). 
